By: Emily Korobko, Arturo Simone, and Luca Vousten
On 28 September, Moldova had a decision to make: incumbent President Maia Sandu termed it “the most important election in the history of the country.” Many internal and external experts marked it as a pivotal choice for Moldova, deciding between orientation towards the European Union (EU) or Russia.
If choosing the EU, Moldova would align itself with European institutions and standards. This would consolidate Moldova’s path to EU accession and increase Brussels’ presence in Eastern Europe. Even without full EU membership, Moldova would still gain stronger ties with the West, particularly NATO and its member states, while simultaneously exerting credible pressure on Russia to reduce its influence.
Alternatively, if choosing Russia, Moldova would move towards a Russian alignment away from Western institutions. This would destabilize Western efforts to secure the region, specifically surrounding southern Ukraine. Transnistria, a breakaway state in the east of Moldova bordering Ukraine, could be further militarised, thus increasing anxiety that another battlefront could be opened in the Ukraine war.
The Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), the ruling pro-European party, gained a victory over the pro-Russian Patriotric Electorial Bloc (BEP) with 50.2% of the vote. But we should not undermine the relevance that the Kremlin’s latest swing of interference has had on the country’s democratic process. A recent BBC investigation offered chilling evidence to the size of financial backing and political scope that the Kremlin put into the operation, including disinformation campaigns and training camps for intelligence agents. The pro-Russian BEP received 24.2% of the vote.
As Moldova is seizing this political momentum to push for European integration, we investigate the role that the Kremlin has played on the country’s latest election round, the reasons behind Russia’s interferences, and whether these results are likely to discourage future attempts at election meddling.
Moldova’s Political Climate
The Moldovan political system has been fragile and divided in recent years. There have been frequent changes in government, collapsed coalitions, and corruption scandals. There is a deepening polarisation between pro-EU and pro-Russia blocks. The issue of corruption is exacerbated by the influence of oligarchs like Ilan Shor, who resides in Russia and is linked to Kremlin narratives. Moldova is also dependent on Russia for energy.
Historically, the region was contested between the Ottoman and Russian empires, with the eastern part of the Principality of Moldavia ceded to the Russian Empire in 1812, and called Bessarabia. Though briefly re-united with the western parts of Moldavia after the Crimean War, and part of Greater Romania after 1918, the region was re-annexed by the USSR in 1940, creating the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Today, Moldova has a divided identity between its Romanian roots and its Russian-speaking Soviet legacy.
An EU Candidate and Nation on the Rise
Moldova is in the midst of a transformation. After the initial diplomatic approach of Eastern European countries and the European Union with the creation of the Eastern Partnership in 2009, Moldova acquired EU candidacy in 2022. This has opened doors to foreign public and private investment into the country, but also sets out concrete steps for Moldova to improve its interior situation and invest in permanent improvement of public institutions, politics, and infrastructure. The results have not gone unnoticed. In recent years, Moldova’s parameters have improved in all categories. The economy is growing, labour participation is at an all-time high, and corruption is steadily making way for institutional transparency and democratic values.
It is no surprise that these changes, developments, and investments are generally welcomed by Moldovan citizens. As such, not only did the most recent election result in a pro-EU victory, but the Moldovan people already reaffirmed their pro-European wish in a 2024 referendum, on top of the election and re-election of pro-EU and PAS leader Maia Sandu in 2020 and 2024 respectively (as well as the election of a pro-EU PAS majority parliament in 2021). On 28 September, 70% of voters opted for parties they perceive as pro-European – regardless of whether those parties proclaimed genuinely or merely declaratively to be pro-EU. These are all major wins, considering the massive Russian efforts into avoiding these results at a high cost.
Russia’s Interests
Russia meddles across entire continents, but Moldova is one of the few countries where it has true skin in the game. The eastern flank of Europe is a crucial area for Russia. A stagnant war is still raging in Ukraine, and Russia’s geopolitical ambitions include asserting influence over as many neighbouring countries as possible, whether through territorial aggression or the acquisition of political power. Georgia has already fallen prey to the latter, Belarus did so some time ago, and still other attempts continue, such as Romania as well as Western European nations like Germany.
Since Moldova’s major steps towards EU integration, the country has been working hard to strengthen ties with the European Union and is preparing for accession in 2030. If Russia can prevent this, it will increase its chance of retaining Moldova as an important strategic partner. The country offers ideal access to Ukraine and Romania, the strategically-located regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia would fall entirely within Russia’s influence, and Moldova could form an essential buffer between Western Europe and Russia’s intended borders.
For the same reason, Moldova’s political course is of great importance to Europe. A strategic loss to Russia introduces a geographically vulnerable point on its eastern border. Moreover, Moldova is now a crucial transit route for arms supplies to Ukraine and grain imports in the other direction. It is therefore not surprising that the recent elections in Moldova were a textbook example of organised and coordinated political influence campaigns by the Russian state. From large-scale disinformation campaigns, organised protests, and vote buying to even the involvement of the church, Russia’s attempts to influence the Moldovan population and politics are visible on all fronts.
Tactics: What’s Old and What’s New?
Disinformation
With the aim of causing disruption and influencing voters, Russian networks have deliberately targeted low-income groups in Moldova to spread disinformation videos via social media in exchange for payment. Hundreds of such videos were shared on platforms such as TikTok and Facebook. This iteration, the campaigns showed deeper use and integration of AI, larger volumes, and more aggressive targeting of the diaspora and anti-EU narratives.
Paid Protesters and Voters
Similarly, Russian networks regularly pay and hire Moldovans to organise and populate organised protests by pro-Russian political parties, which are filmed and then widely disseminated in the media. The organised nature of such protests is evident from their precise duration, usually exactly 30 or 60 minutes, as well as from identically printed posters and clothing, and the visible disinterest of the protesters.*
In the simplest form of paid efforts, Russia regularly buys votes. It also uses more complex vote-rigging methods such as ‘carousel voting,’ where voters are paid to vote with pre-marked ballots and smuggle a fresh ballot out of the polling station, to increase voter control. Transport was organised to get voters from Transnistria into Moldova and Romania. The Russian diaspora was massively transported into Russia and Belarus to cast votes there, in order to better control the voting and motivate the pro-Russian diaspora to exert their right to vote.
Since after the elections, there seems to have been an intention to create chaos with similar tactics. Citizens were detained who were reportedly preparing to set fire to buildings. Numerous bomb threats occurred at Chisinau airport. Paid protests have been organised since the elections and local allies of Russia are contesting the results of the elections.*
The Church
Another new and important role in the Russian influence campaign was reserved for the Moldovan Orthodox Christian Church, which – even after the fall of the Soviet Union – has remained partly subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, closely linked to President Putin. Connections have even been reported between the Moldovan Church and the FSB. The priests, who are usually paid, spread political messages and even campaign materials, which are also disseminated on social media within the framework of church morals and values. The focus is on anti-EU, anti-Western, and anti-LGBT themes.
Illicit Funding
The 2025 campaign also introduced new financial structures. Most importantly, cryptocurrency became the principal channel for the movement of illicit funds into the country. Its use as payment makes it more difficult to detect and control. Record amounts were moved into the country – Ukrainian sources suggest an investment of $350 million for these elections alone. Billions worth of cryptocurrency are moved around, which are then parked in accounts through droppers, cashed out by liquefiers, after which the cash is disseminated by distributors. Some trolls were paid directly in crypto.
Cyber Attacks
On a different but equally impactful front, Russia is attempting to destabilise and manipulate local institutions and systems through hybrid attacks, such as cyberattacks on election offices and electoral institutions, and fake bomb threats at (diaspora) polling stations. The Central Electoral Commission, as well as other governmental infrastructure and important news outlets, were targeted with DDoS attacks (network overload attacks). More surprising, officials were targeted with phone infection malware through Signal messages and a record number of ransomware attacks on government networks were recorded. Notably for the latter, ransom was never demanded, suggesting political objectives.
Russia’s Scenarios
What was Russia aiming for? The tactics all pursued some seizing of political influence in Moldova. To achieve this objective, Russia needed to avert or slow down the European integration of Moldova. For this, there appear to be three possible scenarios.
The maximalist scenario would follow a majority pro-Russian victory in the parliamentary elections, through an alliance of multiple pro-Russian parties. The assembled government would reset and repopulate state institutions and the justice system to remove anti-corruption watchdogs, after which early elections would be initiated to secure a stronger majority, maximising political control.
The median scenario would see inconclusive election results, with no majority coalition formed. Prolonging such a political vacuum would lead to an economic crisis and general tiredness within Moldova of the political leadership. EU integration would be postponed and Russia could increase its chances of political success in subsequent elections.
The minimalist scenario is the one which came into play. The pro-Russian parties lost the election, and the focus shifted to undermining the legitimacy of the election results and sowing distrust in the pro-EU government. Legal warfare is the next step, prolonging the contesting of election results and destabilising the EU integration efforts by de-focusing state resources and preparing for the next elections.
What is Ahead?
With 50.2% of the vote and 55 seats, PAS gained a majority in Parliament, and therefore does not need to form a coalition or make concessions with other parties. It is free to proceed with its goals, including bringing Moldova in line with EU judiciary, anti-corruption, and democratization standards on its path to join the EU by 2030. However, this is only the beginning of a long road. Russian influence efforts have manifested at an unprecedented scale in this vote, and will likely continue attempting to destabilize Moldova. Moldova is a model for a whole-of-society approach to building resilience, praised by leaders across Europe for its handling of the threat. However, despite this election’s outcome, Moldova and the European continent at large should remain vigilant.
Continued investments should be made by European countries to preserve the integrity and legitimacy of their democratic systems. Hybrid warfare takes many forms, from cyber to cultural, and must be countered accordingly through many forms and across sectors. As Moldova looks forward to a future in Europe, its people and government must continue adapting to attempted foreign influence with firm investments in democratic resiliency.
Edited by: Jekaterina Savicka
*As observed by Luca Vousten, one of the writers, who was on location in Chișinău during the runup to the 2025 elections.