By: Konstantinos Anagnostakis
The Strait of Hormuz is currently at the centre of a rapidly escalating geopolitical crisis with global economic and strategic consequences. As one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints, the narrow passage controls the flow of nearly one fifth of globally traded oil and a significant share of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports from the Persian Gulf. Following the launch of Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion in early 2026, direct military engagements between Iran, Israel, and the United States of America have disrupted maritime traffic through the Strait, forcing energy companies and shipping operators to reroute vessels or suspend operations altogether due to increased risks to tankers and crews. This instability has led to rising insurance premiums, volatile energy prices, and broader uncertainty in global supply chains, affecting millions of people worldwide.
These disruptions are not only significant for immediate energy security concerns but also for longer-term structural shifts in global energy dependence, particularly within the European Union. As the EU continues its energy transition and seeks to reduce reliance on politically exposed supply routes and suppliers, shocks in key chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz directly test the resilience and feasibility of that strategy. In this context, Russia’s position in international LNG markets remains relevant because global supply disruptions can indirectly reshape trade flows, pricing dynamics, and supply chains, potentially reinforcing or constraining Russia’s role as an alternative supplier in a fragmented LNG market.
EU regulations to phase-out Russian LNG dependency
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 exposed the EU’s structural dependency on Russian gas and oil supplies. Until that point, Russia had been the Union’s principal supplier of both petroleum products and natural gas. In response, the European Commission introduced multiple sanctions packages aimed at reducing this dependence and accelerating diversification away from Russian energy.
A central objective of EU policy became the transition from Russian pipeline gas to liquefied natural gas, thereby reducing reliance on a single supplier perceived as increasingly unreliable and hostile to EU’s strategic objectives. This shift followed major disruptions in Russian gas supply, including the gradual halt of flows through the pipeline Nord Stream 1, the abandonment of Nord Stream 2, and reduced transit via the Yamal-Europe pipeline. To prevent severe energy shortages, the Commission introduced the REPowerEU Plan in 2022 to phase out Russian fossil fuel imports and diversify supply sources while accelerating clean energy deployment. Subsequently, the AggregateEU mechanism centralised EU demand, creating a more competitive position in global markets. More recently, funding instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the Connecting Europe Facility–Energy have supported cross-border infrastructure expansion to enhance energy security and system integration.
Despite these regulations, the EU continued importing LNG from Russia, primarily through the Yamal LNG project. Yamal is strategically important as it provides Russia with a major Arctic LNG export hub, enabling large-scale shipments to both European and Asian markets via northern sea routes. Unlike Russian oil and pipeline gas, LNG was not fully sanctioned in the years following the invasion of Ukraine. As Europe suddenly lost large volumes of pipeline supply in 2022, it required immediate alternative imports to avoid shortages and price spikes. Existing long-term contracts therefore remained in place, and Russian LNG served as a transitional stabiliser in an otherwise constrained market. As a result, Yamal has become a key source of hard-currency earnings, helping stabilise Russia’s fiscal inflows and acting as a partial financial lifeline. Yamal LNG was also commercially competitive due to its Arctic shipping routes, which allow relatively fast delivery to European terminals. Ports in countries such as France and Belgium became important hubs for receiving and redistributing these cargoes.
As a result, while the EU successfully reduced overall dependency on Russian energy, it simultaneously maintained a partial reliance on Russian LNG as a transitional supply source. Only in early 2026 did the EU adopt a legally binding regulation under the REPowerEU framework to phase out these imports entirely by 2027. The regulation introduces a stepwise ban in which no new Russian gas contracts can be signed, short-term LNG imports are phased out during 2026, and all Russian LNG imports are prohibited by the end of next year.
Pipeline to LNG: Independence or Illusion?
Following these shifts, EU imports of Russian pipeline gas declined sharply from approximately 40% in 2021 to around 6% in 2025. To compensate, the EU has tripled its imports from the United States during the past four years, which now accounts for roughly 60% of imports.
Although the share of Russian LNG imports declined from 22% in 2021 to approximately 15% by late 2025, Russia remained the EU’s second-largest LNG supplier for the same year, generating substantial revenues despite sanctions pressure. More recent data indicate that the EU continued to absorb the vast majority of Yamal LNG exports. In early 2026, Europe accounted for approximately 98% of Yamal’s LNG exports, with imports increasing by 17% compared to the previous year. These volumes, equivalent to over six and a half million tonnes and nearly four billion euros in value, highlight Europe’s continued importance for Russian Arctic LNG exports.
All Yamal LNG shipments in the first quarter of 2026 were directed to Europe, with ports in France, Belgium, and Spain as key destinations. Logistics also play a role in this pattern. European ports allow ice-class LNG tankers to operate on much shorter routes, meaning they can unload cargo and quickly head back to Arctic export terminals for the next shipment, rather than spending extended periods on long-haul deliveries to Asian markets. This pattern arguably enhances the efficiency of Yamal’s export model and Russia’s Arctic’s commercial operations.
The recent military escalation in the Middle East and the disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have further complicated things. Recent Iranian strikes affecting Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG complex, one of the world’s largest LNG production sites, have introduced additional uncertainty into global supply chains. Given that repairs and capacity recovery could take several years, global LNG supply tightness and price volatility are likely to intensify.
Can the phase-out still be implemented by 2027?
The short answer is yes. The EU can still likely proceed with its planned phase-out of Russian LNG by 2027. However, the transition becomes significantly more complex, costly, and exposed to geopolitical risk calculus after the skirmishes in the Strait of Hormuz.
The EU has been structurally preparing for this shift through continued expansion of LNG infrastructure, diversification of supply sources, and long-term reductions in gas demand through efficiency and electrification policies. A prolonged disruption in the Strait of Hormuz would primarily tighten global LNG markets by restricting exports from key global suppliers such as Qatar, thereby increasing global competition for available cargoes and driving up prices.
In such a scenario, the EU would not be expected to revert to Russian LNG, as the phase-out is now legally binding and politically embedded within EU energy policy. Instead, Europe would likely turn to alternative suppliers such as the United States, Norway and Algeria, while driving structural demand reduction through renewable transitions and energy efficiency standards. As a result, turning to alternative suppliers merely shifts dependencies rather than eliminates them.
This transition, however, will not come easily. The United States can supply large LNG volumes, but Europe would face higher import costs and increased political dependence on the USA whose foreign and economic policy decisions have become increasingly unpredictable in recent years. Algeria benefits from geographic proximity yet limited modern infrastructure. The absence of a coherent long-term industrial energy strategy constrain its ability to significantly expand exports. Despite Norway’s reliability, its gas production is already operating near a plateau, leaving limited room for substantial increases in supply. At the same time, Russia is likely to respond strategically by lowering prices to make its LNG more competitive on global markets, potentially attracting some European buyers back, even temporarily. This represents a form of “prolonged decline” rather than full exclusion, one that remains economically vital for Moscow.
Decoupling without de-risking
Ultimately, the post-2022 EU energy strategy reflects a shift from geographically concentrated pipeline dependency on Russia toward a globally exposed LNG-based supply system. The recent disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz highlight how this transition has redefined, rather than eliminated, Europe’s energy vulnerabilities. While diversification reduces dependence on a single supplier, it represents a trade-off, as it simultaneously increases exposure to global price volatility and supply constraints that are closely tied to geopolitical developments.
Maritime chokepoints have therefore become critical sources of systemic risk. Unlike pipelines, LNG supply chains depend on long-distance shipping routes that are highly sensitive to conflict, insurance costs, and transport disruptions. These vulnerabilities are reinforced by the strategic uncertainty surrounding the EU’s key supplier, the United States. While US LNG is central to Europe’s diversification strategy, it is also shaped by unilateral and politically driven decisions in trade, sanctions, and energy policy, making long-term supply conditions neither reliable nor predictable. At the same time, internal fragmentation among EU members continues to threaten the coherence and consistency of the Union’s energy response. Differences in national energy dependence, infrastructure capacity and political priorities reduce the EU’s ability to act as a unified actor during periods of market stress.
Rather than achieving full de-risking, the EU is instead decoupling from Russian gas dependence while continuing to import significant volumes of Russian LNG, particularly Yamal LNG, which still accounts for around 98% of its exports to Europe despite sanctions. Thus, redistributing vulnerabilities across global suppliers and maritime trade routes rather than eliminating them. The Strait of Hormuz crisis therefore does not fundamentally reverse Europe’s strategy but rather exposes the structural limits of its energy autonomy in an increasingly turbulent global energy market.
Edited by: Francesco Milner, Jonathan Verkuil
Image credits: Planet Volumes