By: Claudia Ferrotti
After more than half a century of Baathist rule, Syria entered a new chapter. In November 2024, a coalition of opposition forces launched a surprise offensive called operation “Deterrence of Aggression”. The operation was aimed at liberating Syria from the al-Assad regime and restoring the country’s territorial integrity, under the guidance of the paramilitary political organisation Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Within twelve days, HTS forces captured parts of Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Damascus, forcing President Bashar al-Assad to flee to Moscow in early December. The rapid collapse of the regime created both relief and uncertainty, but what are the political motivations behind the offensive and what comes next?
Who is Who
Under the coordination of the umbrella group al-Fatah al-Mubin, the liberation front is composed of HTS and a coalition of other rebel groups, such as the Ahrar al Sham movement, the National Front for Liberation (NFL), Jaish al-Izza, and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki movement. In particular, HTS, formerly known as al-Nusra Front, is the largest fighting group, counting approximately 30 000 fighters. These groups are backed by the Turkish-aligned rebel forces of the Syrian National Army (SNA) and the Kurdish-dominated and US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and are active in the northern and eastern regions of Syria.
On the other side, the Syrian government forces of the SAA and the National Defence Forces controlled the southern and western parts of the country, particularly the cities of Damascus, Daraa, Homs, Hama, Deir Ez Zur (see Live Universal Awareness Map’s OSINT-based live map of Syria). Despite all their efforts, the government forces were not able to halt the opposition, who gained strategic advantages and, in the night between 29 and 30 November, conquered Aleppo, which was under governmental control since 2016. On 8 December, the opposition forces entered Damascus and took control of the capital, forcing the former President Bashar al-Assad to flee to Moscow during the night.
Political Motivations Behind the Offensive
The opposition front is led by Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Julani, the former governor of Idlib before the offensive. The ambitious aim behind his operation was to liberate the country from al-Assad’s regime. Throughout the years, the regime contributed to enhancing sectarianism and ethnic divides, authoritarianism, repressive violence on political opponents, and the elevation of al-Assad’s family cult. By leading the liberation of Damascus, al-Julani sought more than battlefield success – he sought legitimacy at home and abroad.
For years, HTS carried the burden of its al-Qaeda past. With this operation, al-Julani’s motivations are to rebrand HTS as a political force capable of governance, in order to win support from minority groups and international powers, and to lay the foundation for a state that could replace al-Assad’s authoritarian legacy.
Other groups within the coalition also carried their own motivations. Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), long marginalized, seized the opportunity to secure recognition and a place in Syria’s new power structure. In this way, SDF is trying to push for its long-awaited autonomy and political recognition, ensuring minority protection and representation. On the other hand, Turkey and its proxies have consistently backed opposition forces against al-Assad from the early stages of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011. The regime caused a huge wave of Syrian refugees to Turkey, touching more than 3 million registered refugees. As the Turkish economic crisis intensified in the following years, Syrian refugees were scapegoated by the opposition to get the electorate’s support. The transition from the al-Assad regime into a democratic government would allow for the return of the Syrian refugees. In addition, Turkey-backed rebels viewed Assad’s downfall as a chance to curb Kurdish autonomy while ensuring Turkish security interests.
Even ordinary Syrians, long suffocated by economic crisis and repression, saw the offensive as a way to reclaim dignity and a say in shaping their own government, freedoms, and political rights. Lastly, for refugees, this may be an occasion to return safely to their homes with guarantees of security and recognition.
The Political Value of the Operation, Legitimacy and Balance of Power
The operation “Deterrence of Aggression” represented the first major attack of the opposition forces since the 2020 Idlib ceasefire. As the opposition forces advanced, they freed the political prisoners of the al-Assad regime and, after taking control of Damascus, large crowds of people invaded the streets to celebrate the end of the regime, which has been described as a historic moment for the Syrian people.
Supposedly, the governmental authority collapsed so easily because the strategic support of its allies, especially Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, started to crumble. The fast capitulation of al-Assad is indicative of the misfortunes that its allies are experiencing in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the Hamas-Israel war, respectively. In addition, the al-Assad regime was already weakened by its economic crisis, reportedly sustained by the illicit trade of Captagon. The result was a mass abandonment of soldiers and police officers of their posts, who deserted in light of the poverty conditions that vexed the country. Even the last bulwark of the regime, the former Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, stated that his government would be ready to relinquish its functions to a transitional one.
For all these reasons, the political value of the operation is massive for the Syrian population that hopes for a democratic future after more than 53 years of authoritarian rule. In addition, the attempts of the HTS to detach its image from its past in al-Qaeda and gain international support seem to be successful as the group has obtained the cautious support of the US President Donald Trump, who issued orders to ease sanctions on Syria and to remove the group from the list of international terrorists. The interim government tackled also questions of regional stability: on March 10th, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi signed a tentative agreement with interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa to begin working on integrating the Kurdish-led group into the new Syrian army.
In his first speech, the interim President outlined that Syria’s priorities at the moment focus on filling the power vacuum through legitimate and legal means, promoting sustainable peace through transitional justice, building new state institutions, and protecting public safety. The decision to dismantle all military factions and integrate them into state institutions was one of the most significant moves of the interim government, as this step is crucial for the formation of a nation-state. However, although many factions’ leaders and representatives agreed on this decision, some questions remain open on the next moves toward the dissolution.
Conclusions
The motivations shaping Syria’s new order are varied. HTS’s drive for legitimacy, minority groups’ fight for representation, international powers’ competing interests, and ordinary citizens’ hopes for democracy are diverse and competing motivations. Whether they converge toward a stable future or collide into renewed conflict will determine the country’s path. External competing pressures will also test the interim leadership’s ability to assert independence and legitimacy.
The victory of the liberation forces acquired an important political, social, and humanitarian meaning. It will hopefully represent the foundation of a renewed Syrian state, based on democratic elections, the rule of law, and pluralism. At the same time, Syria’s interim leaders face daunting pressures and economic hardship continues to fuel frustration. Syrians are calling for tangible improvements in jobs, freedoms, and security – not just political promises. For now, the fall of al-Assad has opened a fragile space of possibility. Syria stands at a crossroads where power politics, once defined by authoritarian control, may finally be reshaped by the motivations of those who fought hardest for change.
The prevalent fear is that some loyalist groups could try to regain power while fighting the interim government. However, it seems that this unfortunate option could be averted by the unpopularity that these groups obtained in light of the regime’s abuses. On the other hand, the transformation that HTS underwent under the leadership of al-Julani and the group’s institution-building over the past four years has allowed it to consolidate battlefield victories and now guide the state building project in Syria. What increases the hopes for a democratic future in the country is that a blueprint for political transition in Syria already exists and was delineated in June 2012 by the Action Group for Syria, chaired by the former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. However, questions on the future of Syria remain open on a variety of topics, including doubts on the ways through which the political transition will be achieved and whether the several bureaucratic moves launched in these months will be backed by concrete initiatives, as well as questions of pluralism, public freedoms, and civic and social rights.
Image: A Gathering of People Holding Flags, Idlib, Idlib Governorate, Syria (21/02/2021). Ahmed Akacha.
Edited by: Jekaterina Savicka and Aiyana Vittoria Amplatz